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Abstract
Regional disparities within the European Union have always been perceived as an impediment 
to monetary integration. This is why discussions on a joint currency, from their very beginning, 
were linked to compensatory payments in the form of regional policy payments. Structural 
assistance to poor regions and member states increased sharply at the end of the 1980s. Today, 
however, fiscal support has to be shared with the new member states in the East. Moreover, due 
to the financial crisis, the cheap credit that poor EMU member countries enjoyed as a result 
of interest rate convergence is no longer available. We predict that in the future, some sort of 
financial aid will have to be provided by rich member countries to poor ones, if only to pre-
vent a further increase in economic disparities and related political instability. We also expect 
long-lasting distributional conflict between payer and recipient countries far beyond current 
rescue packages, together with disagreement on the extent of aid required and the political con-
trol to be conceded by receiving countries to giving countries. We illustrate the dimension of 
the distributional conflict by comparing income gaps and relative population size between the 
center and the periphery of Europe on the one hand and on the other, between rich and poor 
regions in two European nation-states characterized by large regional disparities, Germany and 
Italy. While income gaps and population structures are similar in the two countries to those 
between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean periphery, regional redistribution is much 
more extensive in the two nation-states. We conclude that this presages a difficult future for the 
domestic politics of Euroland.
Zusammenfassung
Regionale Disparitäten in der Europäischen Union galten immer als Hindernis für den wäh-
rungspolitischen Integrationsprozess. Aus diesem Grund waren die Verhandlungen über eine 
zukünftige Währungsunion von Anfang an mit Forderungen nach Ausgleichszahlungen in 
Form von regionalpolitischen Hilfsprogrammen verknüpft. Strukturhilfen an arme Regionen 
und Mitgliedsstaaten wurden Ende der 1980er-Jahre erhöht. Heute müssen die entsprechenden 
Mittel allerdings mit den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten im Osten geteilt werden. Zudem können die 
ärmeren EWU-Mitglieder seit der Finanzkrise keine günstigen Kredite mehr aufnehmen. Wir 
gehen davon aus, dass es auch in Zukunft finanzielle Transfers von den reichen zu den armen 
Mitgliedsstaaten wird geben müssen, selbst wenn sie nur dazu dienen, stärkere wirtschaftliche 
Disparitäten und damit einhergehende politische Instabilität zu verhindern. Zudem können 
über die gegenwärtigen Rettungsmaßnahmen hinaus lang anhaltende zwischenstaatliche Ver-
teilungskonflikte zwischen Geber- und Empfängerländern erwartet werden, in welchen es vor 
allem um den Umfang der Finanzhilfen und die im Gegenzug verlangte Abgabe politischer 
Kontrolle durch die Empfänger von Transfers gehen wird. Um die Dimension des Verteilungs-
konflikts zu veranschaulichen, vergleicht der Aufsatz Einkommenslücken und relative Bevölke-
rungsgrößen zwischen Peripherie und Zentrum der EU mit denen zwischen armen und reichen 
Regionen zweier Nationalstaaten mit starken regionalen Disparitäten, Italien und Deutschland. 
Während Einkommenslücken und Bevölkerungsstruktur in den beiden Nationalstaaten denen 
innerhalb der EWU ähneln, ist die regionale Umverteilung in den Nationalstaaten weitaus hö-
her. Wir schließen daraus, dass die Innenpolitik der Eurozone konfliktreich sein wird.
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Monetary Disunion: The Domestic Politics of Euroland
What will the internal politics of the European Monetary Union (EMU) – in short, of 
Euroland – be like once current rescue operations have been declared successful (if they 
ever are)? Euroland is a unique construction: an association of sovereign states that have 
pooled their sovereignty on monetary and, increasingly, economic and fiscal policy in 
collective institutions such as an independent central bank, a supranational bureau-
cracy and a council of their heads of government. While Euroland is not a state, and is 
not intended to become one, it may be described as an international market regime: a 
supranational governance arrangement – a polity – constituted by international treaties 
on a common “internal market” with a common currency. This polity, like any other, 
has domestic politics, although these consist in large part of international relations and 
the foreign policies of constituent states. Figuring prominently within them will be the 
economic disparities and the institutional heterogeneity between the latter, and the 
conflicts over economic sovereignty and economic distribution between Euroland re-
gions constituted as nation-states to which they give rise. This paper will explore aspects 
of the interregional domestic conflicts to be handled in a Euroland polity consisting of 
nation-states and international relations. 
1 EMU, EU, Europe
We begin by taking exception with Angela Merkel’s famous dictum: “Scheitert der Euro, 
so scheitert Europa.”1 Euroland is not Europe. Not even the European Union is Europe: 
after the experience of the crisis, Norway and Switzerland will be even less willing than 
before to join. Apart from Iceland, it is only the remaining Balkan countries and, per-
haps, Turkey that are waiting for admission. As far as the EMU is concerned, it is worth 
remembering that only nineteen of the 28 European Union members belong to it in 
the first place.2 Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom – three European nations 
of considerable import – have reserved the right to remain outside,3 and today it is less 
likely than ever that they will change their minds. Moreover, the crisis has caused the 
UK to demand a significant loosening of the European Union.4 Inside Euroland, the 
1 “If the euro fails, Europe fails.” Angela Merkel in the Bundestag, May 19, 2010.
2 With the formal accession of Lithuania in 2015. Six of the nineteen EMU members have fewer 
than 2 million inhabitants. 
3 Danes and Swedes decided against membership in national referenda (1992 and 2003). The UK 
and Denmark are formally exempted from having to join, while Sweden is informally allowed 
to remain outside due to expected popular opposition.
4 In a speech on the future of the European Union in January 2013, the British Prime Minister 
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division between the Western European center and the Mediterranean periphery has 
deepened as a result of conflicts over austerity and is presently being institutionalized, 
in the Fiscal Pact and otherwise.5 Whether the Eastern European countries that are al-
ready members of the European Union and the Balkan countries waiting to be admitted 
to it will want to accede to the EMU as well – in other words, whether there will be an 
Eastern European periphery in addition to the Southern one – will above all depend on 
the benefits they can expect. We will return to this.
Plans for European monetary union go back well into the 1960s (Issing 2010; James 
2012). When the EMU was finally instituted in the 1990s, it was a project of European 
governments, in particular the government of France, who were tired of having to fol-
low German monetary policy and hoped to achieve a more accommodating European 
monetary policy by Europeanizing the Bundesbank. Germany gave in – to relieve anxi-
eties over unification in 1990 and after its government had convinced itself that with 
the right treaty language, its traditional hard currency policy could be made that of 
the European Union as a whole. In the South – not just in Italy but also in France – 
significant factions of the political establishment looked forward to using monetary 
union with Germany as a tool to discipline their national political economies, especially 
their trade unions. In the 1990s, nationalist modernizers became closely allied with 
neoliberal, globalization-oriented economists who in Italy were based in particular at 
the Banca d’Italia and at Bocconi University in Milan. At the same time, others hoped 
for cheap credit to allow for accelerated economic growth or politically profitable tax 
cuts, and some may have placed their hopes on financial compensation from the North. 
The divergent motives and expectations related to the EMU were never resolved and 
have continued to exist side by side up to the present day, where they underlie the often 
contradictory positions taken by different players on crisis management and institu-
tional reform.
revealed plans to renegotiate the UK’s relations with the EU and promised to hold a referendum 
on Britain’s membership in the EU before the end of 2017 if his party won the next election. 
He stated that “power must be able to flow back to Member States, not just away from them … 
Countries are different.” The full speech can be accessed here: http://www.spiegel.de/interna-
tional/europe/the-full-text-of-the-david-cameron-speech-on-the-future-of-europe-a-879165.
html.
5 Under the various agreements on debt reduction negotiated during the crisis, debtor countries, 
all of them located on the Southern periphery of the EU, will for decades have to have their 
budgets approved by the European Commission, which will in effect be acting on behalf of 
the rich center states in the North. See, for example, Scharpf (2013) on the so-called “Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure” and similar control instruments.
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2 EMU, USA
Economically as well as institutionally, Euroland is characterized by enormous internal 
heterogeneity.6 Regional disparities within Euroland, in the form of national disparities 
between member states, far exceed regional disparities among the federal subunits of 
a country as diverse as the United States. The range of per capita income between the 
poorest and the richest states of the U.S. has always been much smaller than the range 
between the poorest and the richest member states of the EMU.7 GDP per capita in 
Connecticut, the richest state, is roughly twice as high as in the poorest state, Missis-
sippi – a pattern that has been fairly stable since the 1990s. In Euroland, in contrast, 
Germany’s GDP per capita in 1995 was eight times higher than Slovakia’s, by far the 
poorest country at the time.8 Excluding Slovakia, per capita income in Germany was 
three times that in the second-lowest country, Slovenia. In 2012, while Slovakia has 
almost caught up with the other poor countries, per capita income in the richest EMU 
country, Belgium at the time, was 2.8 times as high as in the poorest (2012).
The same picture results if we look at more comprehensive measures of income varia-
tion. Throughout the last two decades, the coefficient of variation of per capita income 
between Euroland countries was consistently higher than between U.S. federal states.9 
While the regional income spread in the U.S. has been roughly constant since the early 
1990s, with the coefficient of variation fluctuating between 0.156 and 0.160, national 
incomes in Euroland began to converge in the mid-1990s. Still, even excluding Slovakia, 
variation has remained considerably above the United States, declining from 0.286 in 
2000 to 0.252 in 2008, to rebound to 0.278 after the crisis (2012). Note that in the wake 
of the financial crisis, income inequality has risen between Euroland countries but not 
between U.S. states. As there is no fiscal union in the European Monetary Union, there 
are no automatic fiscal stabilizers in Euroland, unlike in its member states. Automatic 
stabilizers, as built into taxation, pension, and unemployment insurance systems, help 
countries equalize the regional effects of economic shocks by transferring resources 
to regions most hit by an economic downturn “without the explicit intervention of a 
country’s fiscal authority” (in ’t Veld et al. 2012).
6 The American bank J. P. Morgan has calculated the heterogeneity of different actual and hy-
pothetical currency unions using more than 100 economic, social, and political indicators. It 
turned out that the twelve most important EMU member states form a less homogeneous union 
than would the countries that belonged to the Ottoman Empire around 1800; all countries on 
the fifth parallel north latitude; and all countries with a name beginning with the letter “M”. J. P. 
Morgan, Eye on the Market, May 2, 2012.
7 Federal states and member states, respectively, with less than or around one million inhabit-
ants are excluded. Among them are outliers such as Luxemburg, the District of Columbia and 
Alaska, which have an extremely high per capita income due to unusual economic conditions.
8 Slovakia had a GDP per capita of only 2,800 Euros in 1995. In comparison, per capita income in 
other relatively poor countries like Greece and Slovenia was 8,500 and 8,100 Euros, respectively.
9 Again, countries and states with a population of around one million or less are excluded. 
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The extent of regional disparities between the territorial subunits of the United States 
and Euroland is perhaps best pictured by box plots representing the distribution of 
per capita incomes among territorial subunits (Figure 1). The boxes’ lower bounda-
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Figure 1 Variation in average per capita income, U.S. Federal States and 
 EMU member states, 2000, 2008, 2012
Average per capita income in 2000=100. Excluding states with less than 1 million inhabitants.
Source: Eurostat; Bureau of Economic Analysis; United States Census Bureau.
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ries mark the 25th, the upper boundaries the 75th percentile; the thin lines above and 
below the boxes indicate the range of the distribution. The smaller the box, the more 
compressed are the central fifty percent of the cases around the median, which is rep-
resented by the line inside the box. We use standardized values to enable comparison 
between data in different currencies. The figure visualizes the true extent of the varia-
tion in regional per capita income as well as the dramatic difference in regional diversity 
between the U.S. and Euroland. It also shows the highly skewed nature of the Euroland 
distribution – skewed toward the bottom – as compared to the relatively continuous 
distribution in the United States.
3 The political economy of Euroland
Today’s pro-euro coalition includes the export industries of surplus countries, in par-
ticular Germany. Allied with them are the trade unions that organize their workers, who 
share the interest of their employers in assured access to a large “internal market” where 
they can sell their products at prices undistorted by the politics of national exchange 
rates. Exporters in Northern surplus countries also appreciate the fact that, because of 
the participation of the Mediterranean deficit countries, the external value of the com-
mon currency is lower than what a Northern European or German currency would be. 
Furthermore, there is a long-standing alliance of liberal economists and European tech-
nocrats who, for partially different reasons, want to make money exogenous to national 
politics, so as to preclude national political interference with European “market forces.” 
In the Mediterranean countries, monetary union can also count on the support of large 
segments of a growing urban middle class to whom a devaluation of their national cur-
rency would mean higher prices for imported consumer goods, such as German luxury 
cars or kitchens. Moreover, high income earners obviously like the freedom of capital 
movement that comes with monetary union, as it allows them to take their money abroad 
whenever they want, above and beyond financial integration in the internal market.
In an important sense, monetary union amounts to a return to an international gold 
standard. Conceived as the crowning completion of the internal market of 1992, the 
EMU eliminates national political discretion from the international political economy 
of the Euroland part of Europe. While monetary union offers a robust solution to some 
of the coordination problems of an increasingly internationalizing capitalist economy, 
it eliminates devaluation as a last resort for member countries lagging in “competi-
tiveness” – i.e., producing at higher unit labor costs than other member countries.10 
A common currency makes it impossible for countries producing at higher unit labor 
costs to mask their low competitiveness by cutting the value of the currency in which 
10 In fact, it does so even more strictly than could an international gold standard, which as Keynes 
among others noted was always subject to some degree of national manipulation, in particular 
through central bank intervention.
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foreign customers pay for their products and thereby lowering their prices without hav-
ing to lower the wages and entitlements of their citizens. Having lost the option of 
manipulating their unit of account, they have just two ways left out of low and poten-
tially declining incomes and high and potentially growing unemployment: they may 
either lower the costs or upgrade the value of their products – bring down their prices 
to match their international market value or raise their international value to match 
their national prices. The former replaces external devaluation with what has come to 
be called “internal devaluation,” raising productivity by cutting wages, pensions and 
public expenditure – euphemistically referred to as “structural reforms” – in order to 
lower costs. The latter would raise productivity by upgrading production factors and 
products, relying on regional industrial policy fueled by external financial aid and de-
velopment assistance, to justify the high prices needed to pay for high costs. Both paths 
promise convergence in economic performance under the common currency and may, 
in principle, be combined.
Euroland, as we have pointed out, is highly heterogeneous economically, even in com-
parison with the United States. This fact was not unknown to the EMU’s founding 
fathers. They expected, however, that free access of weaker national economies to the 
European internal market and enhanced confidence of investors in their monetary and 
political stability would result in these economies catching up through higher long-term 
growth, with time and, perhaps, with a little help from their friends. Others recognized 
early on that there were also structural issues. For example, the Canadian economist 
Robert Mundell, the leading authority on the subject, was well aware that Euroland was 
far from an “optimum” currency area, as lack of labor mobility across national borders 
and pronounced differences in the structural composition of national economies were 
likely to make the EMU highly vulnerable to “asymmetric shocks.” More important for 
him, however, was that monetary union would make it impossible for national govern-
ments to avoid liberal reforms by temporarily restoring competitiveness through de-
valuation.11 For those who followed in his footsteps, including the neoliberal hardliners 
at the Bundesbank who finally fell in line with the Kohl government, monetary union 
as constituted by the Treaty was – or rather had to be – a giant European convergence 
program under which the Mediterranean countries would learn – and indeed would 
have to learn – to reform their institutions, in particular their labor markets, in line with 
the requirements of life under a hard currency regime like the German one.12 Behind 
11 Already in 1973, Mundell dismissed concerns about divergence between European countries 
making monetary union impractical with a clearly political argument: “Rather than moving 
toward more flexibility in exchange rates within Europe the economic arguments suggest less 
flexibility and a closer integration of capital markets. … On every occasion when a social dis-
turbance leads to the threat of a strike, and the strike to an increase in wages unjustified by 
increases in productivity and thence to devaluation, the national currency becomes threatened. 
Long-run costs for the nation as a whole are bartered away by governments for what they pre-
sume to be short-run political benefits” (Mundell 1973: 147, 150).
12 As noted, there were influential sympathizers with this view in the respective countries them-
selves, for example at Bocconi and the Banca d’Italia. The French were more ambivalent: while 
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this was general confidence in the salutary educational effects of unbridled competi-
tion, and in economic rationality of the German kind ultimately carrying the day even 
in countries like Italy or Greece.13
Less optimistic on convergence is a strand of literature more or less in the “varieties of 
capitalism” tradition (Streeck 2011), which emphasizes the stickiness and inertia of ex-
isting national economic institutions, established political power structures and conflict 
lines, and habituated political-economic practices. The tenor is that national economies 
that are as different from one another as in Europe, and are likely to remain so for a 
long time, cannot be equally viable under a common, one-size-fits-all monetary regime. 
Some – in particular countries of the German type, with the Netherlands, Austria, and 
Finland mentioned most often in addition to Germany – will prosper while others, espe-
cially the Mediterranean countries, will suffer (Hall 2012 ). Different national economies 
need different national monetary regimes that fit their specific conditions.14 Analytical 
concepts used to make the case vary: Baccaro and Benassi, for example, in an unpub-
lished paper, speak of profit-led and demand-led economies; others distinguish export-
led and domestic demand-led growth (Johnston and Regan 2014) or export-savings and 
consumption-credit regimes (Mertens 2013).15 Related arguments have been made by 
economists for some time, among them Martin Feldstein (2011) and Charles Blankart 
(2013 ).16 While they all expect European Monetary Union either to break apart or cause 
highly divisive conflicts among member states, some see Germany rising to quasi-im-
perial dominance in Europe at the expense of the weaker economies of the South while 
others, including a number of German economists sympathizing with the new anti-euro 
party, AfD, expect Germany to be blackmailed by a majority of EMU members into sub-
sidizing underperforming Mediterranean economies and ways of life.17
Delors celebrated “the German model,” the Left, and perhaps Mitterand, may have hoped for 
the euro to be a little less German and a little more French.
13 Those who did not share that confidence, like the President of the Bundesbank from 1993 to 
1999, Hans Tietmeyer, remained skeptical on EMU, although they only rarely spoke up in public.
14 See Ralf Dahrendorf, sociologist and one-time European Commission member, in a December 
1995 (!) interview in Der Spiegel: “The currency union is a grave error, a quixotic, reckless, and 
misguided goal, that will not unite but break up Europe. [SPIEGEL: But the essential idea is 
precisely convergence.] Dahrendorf: It won’t work, for their economic cultures are too different 
… The currency union project instills into countries German behavior, but not all countries 
want to act like Germany. For Italy, occasional devaluations are much more useful than fixed 
exchange rates, and for France higher state expenditures make much more sense than rigid ad-
herence to a stability doctrine that is used mainly by Germany.”
15 See also, in a similar vein, Armingeon and Baccaro (2012), Collignon (2013), Hancké (2013), 
Höpner and Lutter (2014), Höpner and Schäfer (2012), Iversen and Soskice (2013), Ramskogler 
(2013), Scharpf (2013), and others.
16 Blankart (2013 ) gives a detailed historical and institutional account of the different functions 
especially of money as an institution and public spending as a tool of policy and politics in 
Germany and France, elaborating with impressive erudition on the intuitions of Dahrendorf as 
quoted above.
17 The reason why German liberal economists have come to oppose an institution like the EMU 
that had originally been designed to their taste is their Public Choice-like lack of confidence 
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However that may be, hopes for convergence among EMU member countries have not 
materialized, and initial catch-up growth in the early 2000s is now seen as largely artifi-
cial, caused by speculative investment made possible by fundamentally unjustified access 
to cheap credit.18 That growth ended in 2008 when what is now seen as irresponsible 
lending ended, laying bare the continuing deficits in competitiveness. To the extent that 
lagging competitiveness in peripheral countries is explained by their institutions, the 
common denominator of the literature is that EMU countries have different proclivities 
to inflation, some needing higher inflation than others to reach a socially acceptable level 
of employment and growth.19 Everything else being equal, being unable to adjust their 
exchange rates, lagging countries may have to live with a steady decline in competitive-
ness as their inflation rates continue to be above those of other countries under the same 
(hard) currency regime. How far apart EMU member countries are today with respect 
to their competitiveness is indicated by a calculation of what would be the “fair value” 
exchange rate of their national currencies if they had one. While in 2013 the fair value of 
the euro compared to the dollar was, at 1.33, slightly lower than the actual exchange rate 
(1.36), for Germany the euro was undervalued by more than 13 percent whereas for Italy 
and Greece it was overvalued by 12 and 24 percent, respectively (Table 1).
Differences in economic performance between the territorial subunits of a currency 
union, national or international, inevitably elicit a political response. While national 
governments may neglect the plight of poor regions at their political peril, such ne-
glect is hardly possible in a union of sovereign states whose poorer members have, at 
in Mediterranean governments carrying out the “economic reforms” supposedly necessary for 
economic convergence, as well as suspicion about Kohl-style international opportunism of Ger-
man governments caving in to combined pressures from France and the Mediterranean periph-
ery for financial redistribution from Germany.
18 Credit was cheap because of a rapid decline of long-term interest rates during the run-up to 
EMU, from 17 percent (Greece) and 12 percent (Portugal, Italy, Spain) in 1995 to only 5 percent 
in 2000. Between 2000 and 2008, net external debt increased from 20 percent of GDP to 80 per-
cent in Greece, Spain and Portugal, and 40 percent in Italy.
19 Or, the other way around: their institutionally determined non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) exceeds that of other, more “competitive” member countries.
Table 1 “Fair value” of the euro in U.S. dollars for the Eurozone and six national 
 economies of EMU member states; actual exchange rate of euro for U.S. dollar
Fair value Over/Under valuation 
(percent)
Actual rate
Germany 1.53 –13.2
Eurozone 1.33 –2.3 1.36
Spain 1.26 5.4
Portugal 1.24 7.3
France 1.23 7.8
Italy 1.19 12.1
Greece 1.07 24.4
Source: Morgan Stanley, 2013: FX Pulse – Waiting to Buy Risk. Morgan Stanley Research. Accessible 
online: http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/research/pdf/FXPulse_20130117.pdf
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least in principle, the option of secession.20 Moreover, if economically weaker member 
countries are democracies, impoverishment resulting from low competitiveness may 
destabilize them politically, with unpredictable external effects. Just as regional dispari-
ties inside nation-states produce political pressures for some sort of inter-regional re-
distribution, national disparities in an international currency union will raise the issue 
of international redistribution. In both cases, there is likely to be resistance from those 
having to foot the bill, who will insist on transfers being kept as low as possible and con-
ceived strictly as measures to enable recipients to become self-sufficient – with subsidies 
used for investment rather than consumption.21 Transfers in favor of lagging territorial 
units, whether in a country or in an international monetary union, are therefore typi-
cally designated as aid for economic development provided to enable recipients ulti-
mately to stand on their own feet. 
How economically effective such assistance can be – and how to prevent its diversion 
from investment to consumption – is a much debated question, especially at the inter-
national level where donor countries may also want to keep cooperative governments in 
office and stabilize existing regimes and their state machineries. Mainstream economics 
tends to oppose any regional assistance that involves financial transfers, claiming that it 
is only through “painful reforms”22 that low competitiveness can be cured. But while a 
position like this may perhaps be politically sustainable in a nation-state with a strong 
central government, such as Britain, it may break up an international currency union 
– not just because there are few if any examples of a neoliberal Rosskur working (Blyth 
2013), but because imposing it from the outside on a national society would require a 
degree of international intervention in a country’s internal affairs that its citizens may 
be unwilling to tolerate. This is why the prohibition on international compensation 
payments in the Maastricht Treaty is no more than pro forma: with significant per-
formance differences between countries joined in a monetary union, there is no way 
around some sort of inter-country redistribution; the question is only in what form.
20 The Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary Union does not provide for member country exit 
or exclusion. But what this means in effect has never been tested, and in a state of emergency 
there is no limit to institutional creativity. In any case, both exit and exclusion were explicitly 
discussed behind more or less closed doors at the height of the Greek debt crisis.
21 The equivalent in social policy is the replacement of “passive,” “decommodifying” benefits with 
“active” or “activating” ones.
22 That is, “internal devaluation.” The problem of neoliberal reform is that it expects governments 
to inflict on their citizens in the short run the very same suffering that is predicted to result for 
them from non-reform in the long run – in the hope that reform will, in the long run, restore 
the prosperity that has to be sacrificed in the short run.
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4 The political economy of European regional policy
Financial assistance to Western Europe’s Mediterranean fringe has a long history, doc-
umenting that European governments never had much confidence in spontaneous 
economic convergence. In the 1950s and 1960s, the six-country European Economic 
Community already provided regional assistance to Italy to help it manage the tensions 
between the rich North and the poor mezzogiorno (Irving 1976; Ginsborg 1990: 160, 
passim). Regional and social assistance programs were greatly expanded after the tran-
sition to democracy of Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the 1970s, and in particular upon 
the three countries’ accession to what was to become the European Union. Designed 
to stabilize their Mediterranean glacis politically as well as economically, their objec-
tive was to prevent a return of fascism and military dictatorship and to avert the area 
from turning Eurocommunist (Webb 1979; Pons 2010). In particular, membership in 
the European Union and in NATO was to make it possible for the newly democratized 
Mediterranean countries to move onto a social-democratic development path and help 
them to avoid confronting their historical legacies of semi-feudal local and regional 
power structures associated with clientelism and corruption.
European regional policy was frequently reorganized, as were the institutions that gov-
ern it. Landmark reforms took place in 1988, leading among other things to a doubling 
of the structural funds by 1993 (George/Bache 2001). Today, structural funds amount 
to roughly one third of the budget of the European Union, equivalent to 0.3 to 0.35 
percent of the combined GDP of European Union countries (2007–2012). Whether 
this has contributed to economic growth in recipient countries and to what extent is 
examined by a vast body of literature ranging from case studies to econometric analyses 
and macroeconomic simulations (for two overviews, see Ederveen et al. 2003; Bachtler/
Gorzelak 2007). The results are, unfortunately, inconclusive.23 Arguably, however, this 
does not speak against the political effectiveness of regional policy, to the extent that one 
of its purposes was and is to keep democratic governments in the Mediterranean and 
the pro-European social coalitions supporting them in power and happy.
As far as monetary union is concerned, it was always clear, and in fact was already a sub-
ject in the earliest discussions on a joint currency, that the elimination of devaluation 
would have to be accompanied by substantial compensation payments in the form of 
regional and structural aid to less competitive member states. During the negotiations 
on the Regional Development Fund in 1975, one main argument of the commission in 
favor of regional policies was that a future monetary union would not work without 
regional assistance programs (Bache 2006). The problem, as seen at the time, is clearly 
exposed in the “Report on the Regional Problems of the Enlarged Community” of 1973, 
better known as the “Thomson Report,” which is worth quoting at some length:
23 For recent negative assessments, see Becker et al. (2012), Hesse et al. (2012), ZEW (2012).
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It is clear that rapid progress towards Economic and Monetary Union would be arrested if 
national economies had not undergone the transformations needed to avoid excessive diver-
gencies between the economies of Member States. The reduction, by appropriate means, of 
regional imbalances is therefore a factor for accelerating those economic changes upon which 
the strength of Economic and Monetary Union will depend when it comes to abandoning re-
course to parity changes as a way of restoring a fundamental balance. No Member State can 
be expected to support the economic and monetary disciplines of Economic and Monetary 
Union without Community solidarity involved in the effective use of such instruments; equally 
Member States must be prepared to accept the disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union as 
a condition of this Community support. (Commission of the European Communities 1973)
By the end of the twentieth century, however, European Union structural assistance to 
the future EMU member countries in the Mediterranean had to be shared with another 
set of newly democratized client states in the East, at a time when Western European 
countries were making first efforts to consolidate their public finances. While at the 
beginning of the 2000s, almost sixty percent of the structural funds were devoted to 
the Southern European countries, today their share has shrunk to only thirty percent, 
with that of Eastern European countries growing bigger and bigger (Figure 2).24 Since 
2009, payments to the East of Europe have exceeded support for the South. Luckily, as 
mentioned above, accession to the EMU had the welcome side effect for Mediterranean 
countries of significantly easing their access to credit. For the European Union, this 
meant that it could freeze its assistance to the Mediterranean, and in fact slowly reduce 
it, at a time when it had to increase its transfers to the new democracies in the East.
The combined effect of EMU and the diversion of EU regional assistance to the Union’s 
Eastern members is particularly visible in the Greek case (Figure 3). Even before EMU 
the interest rate the Greek state had to pay on new long-term debt declined from sev-
enteen to six percent within five years, to reach a low of four percent in the mid-2000s. 
Simultaneously European Union structural assistance fell from four to two percent of 
GDP. In compensation, the government deficit, brought down, in preparation of EMU 
accession, from nine to three percent in 1999, exploded to reach almost 16 percent ten 
years later. In spite of this, due to the low interest rates made possible by EMU, the share 
of debt service in public spending remained almost unchanged until after the crisis 
while total public debt rapidly accumulated.
24 In the 1990s, structural aid from the European Union amounted to between 2.5 and 3.5 percent 
of GDP in Portugal and between 2.0 and 3.2 percent in Greece. In Spain, transfers from the 
structural funds ranged from 0.7 to 1.4 percent of the country’s GDP, whereas in Italy financial 
assistance was always below 0.5 percent (EU Budget Financial Reports, own calculation). Today, 
receipts from European Union structural funds range between 1.5 and 2.0 percent in Portugal 
and Greece, and contribute only 0.5 percent to the GDP in Spain. Numbers do not include pay-
ments under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as only regional and structural policy is 
explicitly targeted at poor regions, with the objective of regional and national convergence. Sup-
port from the structural funds (the two most important ones being the Regional Development 
Fund and the European Social Fund) is provided mainly for investment in infrastructure, hu-
man resources, and the productive environment, meaning small and medium-sized enterprises.
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Today the replacement of international fiscal transfers by international private credit 
– much in parallel by the way to the “privatization of Keynesianism” in the domes-
tic political economies of the 1990s (Crouch 2009, 2011) – has collapsed, and with it 
the deceptive economic progress in Mediterranean countries. One way of reinstating 
credit would be by mutualization of the accumulated public debt of deficit countries, 
together with a guarantee by the rich countries of the North for repayment in the case 
of default. Even though Northern governments have powerful means at their disposal 
to hide commitments of this sort from their voters, however, it is far from certain that 
they would in the end go unnoticed. A return to direct fiscal assistance, as before 1999, is 
not unproblematic either, given that the number of countries that will be claiming sup-
port is now much higher, since it includes the Balkan states still waiting for admission 
to both the EU and the EMU. Moreover, member states at the center of the EMU have, 
more than ever, come under fiscal pressure themselves – by the global financial industry 
demanding consolidation of their public finances, as well as by the very tax competition 
they have in the past considered a central pillar of the European “internal market.”25 
25 It remains to be seen which new methods will be devised to keep deficit countries financially 
afloat in order to keep their political elites and, through them, their populations sufficiently 
“pro-European.” In this respect, an important role will be, and indeed is, played by the European 
Central Bank, which has for some time engaged in covert financing of government deficits by 
extending cheap credit to banks.
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Still, assessing the likely issues of contention and lines of conflict within EMU as a 
multi-state polity, it seems reasonable to assume that the current rescue operations in 
response to the debt crisis will not be the end of international financial assistance. On-
going debates on a “European Marshall Plan” or a “European growth package” make a 
continuation of financial support into the foreseeable future seem likely, in whatever 
form and under whatever name. This holds true even if it was in fact possible to improve 
the competitiveness of peripheral countries in the neoliberal way: by cutting them off 
from financial assistance and leaving them with harsh structural reforms as their only 
remaining option. The risk of governments being voted out of office and EMU breaking 
apart as a result of popular discontent in its periphery would probably seem politically 
unacceptable. As long as member state governments in the South, and later in the East 
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as well, need to be democratically elected, they will therefore be in a position to extract 
some sort of financial aid, to enable them to build up a competitive infrastructure; pro-
long and thereby ease the internal devaluation process; buy political support to prevent 
the rise to power of an “anti-European” opposition party; or all of the above.
In the following section, we will explore the international configuration and the politi-
cal-economic requirements, possibilities, and limits of regional assistance policy inside 
the EMU, whether to improve the indigenous potential for growth, support structural 
reform by buffering its economic and social costs, or stabilize pro-European national 
politics. To do this, we will look first at the structure of the EMU as a whole and then 
compare it with two member countries, Italy and Germany, with high regional dispari-
ties, associated in Germany with the introduction of monetary union with the former 
GDR in the course of unification. 
5 Givers and takers: Distributional conflict in Euroland
There can be little doubt as to how member countries will line up on the issue of fi-
nancial aid. Of the 18 states that are now in the EMU, five are economically weak and 
will remain so for a long time, while six others are mini-states with populations of less 
than two million. Only five countries have relatively strong economies and more than five 
million citizens, with three of them – Germany, France, and the Netherlands – account-
ing for a population of 162 million out of a total of 175 in this group. In other words, 
the EMU’s economically and politically relevant center consists of only three countries, 
while its Southern periphery consists of six26 (and its future Southeastern periphery of 
no less than ten: Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Rumania, and later Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). 
Treating Euroland as an integrated international polity, a central issue of its domestic 
politics will be the nature and extent of the regional policies to be put in place, presum-
ably to promote convergence in economic competitiveness. In a stylized account, two 
goods will be traded between the EMU’s center and periphery: financial support given 
by the former to the latter, and political control conceded in return by the latter to the 
former. This is because financial support will not be given unconditionally, not even if 
it is portrayed as an expression of “European solidarity.” Typically, giver countries will 
conceive transfers as assistance to becoming self-sufficient, at least for public presenta-
tion. While they will be keen on not paying more than necessary, whatever that may be, 
they will also insist that the money is used for investment rather than consumption, to 
the greatest possible extent, with the declared purpose for receiving countries to become 
self-sufficient. The latter, for their part, will want to maximize what they receive and use 
26 Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus.
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part or all of it for consumption, if only to keep political discontent manageable. At the 
same time, they will strive to minimize the extent to which they have to concede control 
over domestic policies to giver countries, while these will demand that control over the 
use of transferred funds be international rather than domestic (Table 2).
How the EMU member states will divide into a ruling center and a ruled periphery, and 
at what economic cost for the former and political price for the latter, will have impor-
tant consequences for democracy on both sides. External political control will constrain 
national democracy in receiving countries,27 while the need to hide the true amount of 
transfers from an electorate that is itself facing fiscal austerity may do the same in giv-
ing countries. The terms of the exchange will also affect the attractiveness of the EMU 
to potential members. If transfers are extensive and international control over their use 
limited, rich countries like Denmark or Sweden may continue to remain outside while 
the poor countries of the European Southeast may have a strong incentive to join. Vice 
versa, if financial benefits are low due to fiscal constraints or political discontent in the 
center, and international political interference is strong, rich countries may be prepared 
to join while poor countries may prefer to stay out and become “anti-European,” or 
join only in order to change the terms of the settlement in alliance with the other poor 
countries. As a result, conflict inside the EMU would further intensify.
To get a sense of the problem load for a future EMU regional policy, we can compare in-
come gaps and relative populations for different divisions between the European center 
and its Mediterranean periphery (Table 3). Taking Germany, France, and the Nether-
lands to be the center, different peripheries would be associated with different degrees 
of regional disparity. For example, Italy had a population in 2012 that amounted to 37 
percent of the population of the three center countries, while its per capita income was 
21 percent below the weighted per capita income of the latter. All four Mediterranean 
countries taken together were more than twice as big as Italy in relation to the center, 
while their income gap amounted to 29 percent.
27 See the so-called Fiscal Compact, entered into by all but two EU member states in 2012, in the 
form of an international treaty outside the European Union legal framework. It obliges states 
whose budgets are not in balance or in surplus to report to the European Commission and the 
Council and implement “reforms” as demanded by these. Noncompliance can be financially 
sanctioned by a fine of up to 0.1 percent of a state’s GDP.
Table 2 Center vs. periphery: Preferences on financial support and political control
 Financial support Political control
Center
Minimize amount
Maximize investment 
Maximize international   
control
Periphery
Maximize amount
Allow for consumption
Defend national control
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What does this imply for the regional policy effort required to alleviate EMU regional 
disparities or at least contain political discontent in poor countries? Note that neither 
financial transfers nor the ample infusions of cheap credit after 2000 were sufficient 
in 2008 to prevent the collapse of regional competitiveness under the impact of fixed 
exchange rates. If this means that financial assistance would have to be significantly 
stocked up to effectively promote convergence – also in view of the current credit 
crunch – prospects must appear bleak. Not only will countries at the center be unable 
or unwilling to pay for more than a symbolic increase in European Union regional 
funds for the Mediterranean, but an ever larger share of the available financial resources 
will have to be devoted to Eastern Europe. This goes a long way toward explaining why 
Western European countries and the European Union place their hope for economic 
growth and EMU cohesion so desperately on neoliberal reform, even in the absence of 
any positive example.28
6 For comparison: Germany and Italy
To learn more about the prospects of an EMU regional policy, we may look at the ex-
periences of two member countries with high regional disparities, Italy and Germany. 
Both regard regional policy as essential for national cohesion. In 1990, West Germany 
entered into a much debated monetary union with an entirely uncompetitive East Ger-
many, while Italy tried hard throughout the twentieth century to close the economic 
gap between its rich North and poor South. Although in both countries, considerable 
resources were transferred in a long-drawn effort to equalize living standards, regional 
inequalities are far from resolved. As a crude indicator of the two countries’ current 
regional problems one may take the sum of the relative size of the population in pe-
ripheral areas and the difference in per capita income (Table 4). It turns out that Italy, 
28 The latter may, in turn, explain the current recourse to a policy of cheap money, as pursued 
by the European Central Bank. This is in spite of the fear among central bankers that out-of-
thin-air money production may spare countries the “reform” efforts that the central banks have 
unrelentingly demanded since the crisis began. Central bankers know better than others that 
excessive money production may easily cause a replay of the financial crisis of 2008.
Table 3 EMU: Population size and income gap (2012)
 Population Percent D, F, NL Income Income gap
Italy 60.8 37.1 25,700 20.5
Spain 46.8 28.6 22,300 31.0
Greece 11.1 6.8 17,200 46.8
Portugal 10.5 6.4 15,600 51.7
I, ESP, GR, P 129.2 78.9 22,917 29.1
ESP, GR, P 68.4 41.8 20,444 36.8
D, F, NL 163.8 100.0 32,328  
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with a figure of 94 (53 plus 41), is far worse off than Germany, where the sum of the 
two percentages is 52 (25 plus 27). We have applied the same measure to different cen-
ter-periphery constellations inside the EMU, finding the German problem load to be 
comparable to a situation where the periphery in relation to the three countries of the 
center is constituted by either Spain or Greece. An Italian-level problem load is reached 
when the periphery consists of Spain, Greece and Portugal, or of all four Mediterranean 
countries including Italy.
Going back to Germany and Italy, we can now tentatively explore the relationship be-
tween problem loads, fiscal transfers, and the success of regional policy over time. In 
Italy, transfers were as high as five percent of GDP in a period when, after the end of 
postwar growth, the national income gap began to increase for more than two decades. 
Recently the North-South income gap seems to have declined again and is now prob-
ably where it was in the early 1960s (Figure 4).29 In Germany, where the peripheral 
population is proportionally far smaller than in Italy (25 percent as compared to 53 
percent), transfers amounted to between three and four percent of GDP since the mid-
1990s, which in effect was almost one-and-a-half times as much as in Italy.30 Still, the 
income gap has declined only very gradually since the mid-1990s.
Why has regional policy in the two countries effected so little? Clearly, Italy suffers from 
a demography that is more unfavorable than Germany’s, making transfers of a given 
percentage of GDP both more expensive for the paying and less substantial for the re-
ceiving regions. Another explanation points to the social structure of the mezzogiorno 
and the politics of the Italian South, causing economic aid to be appropriated by cor-
rupt local power elites and criminal enterprises, or converted into an instrument of 
vote-buying by governing parties in the region or nationally. This has contributed to 
making help for the mezzogiorno highly unpopular with voters in the North, and every 
29 Data on Italy are from Daniele and Malanima (2007).
30 By far the biggest share of fiscal transfers in Germany is social security payments to East Ger-
man citizens. Relative to the East German GDP, net social security payments amount to around 
20 percent. Moreover, through the fiscal equalization system among the Länder, tax revenue is 
horizontally transferred from West to East. Furthermore, the federal government funds regional 
policy programs to combat the structural weakness of the East German economy (Kloß et al. 
2012). The latter transfers come closest to those in the context of EU structural policy; they 
amount to five percent of the East German GDP. We have found no reliable information on the 
structure of fiscal transfers in Italy.
Table 4 Center-periphery problem load: Germany, Italy and EMU
Center Periphery Problem load
Northern Italy Southern Italy 94
West Germany East Germany 52
D, F, NL Greece 54
D, F, NL Spain 60
D, F, NL ESP, GR, P 79
D, F, NL I, ESP, GR, P 108
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new example of bribery and corruption reinforces resistance to further transfers. In 
fact, for almost two decades now, a separatist political party, the Lega Nord, commands 
a majority in several Italian regions north of Rome. 
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Comparing this to Germany, one may note that in Eastern Germany after unification, 
the entire ruling class of the former German Democratic Republic was replaced with 
political leaders, civil servants, and businesspeople imported from the West together 
with the full package of West German institutions. Corruption and vote-buying were 
almost nonexistent, certainly in comparison with the mezzogiorno, and issues of gover-
nance were resolved by putting in place an entirely new political establishment together 
with a fundamentally reconstructed administrative machinery. Still, differences in living 
standards between East and West Germany diminished only slowly if at all, even though 
transfers were effectively higher than in Italy. In fact, it is widely understood that present 
levels of regional support will have to be maintained when the current regional policy 
program for Eastern Germany runs out (Kloß et al. 2012). If transfers were significantly 
curtailed, regional disparities can be expected to increase again – implying that most of 
what financial aid has achieved up to now, after a quarter-century of Aufbau Ost, was to 
prevent the income gap from widening further.
7 Regional redistribution in an international polity
For the EMU this does not bode well. Even if some of the Mediterranean countries 
were soon able to stand on their own feet, the minimum effort required from the three 
countries forming the center of the EMU to avoid a further increase in international 
disparities is likely to be equivalent to the German effort for East Germany. Roughly 
speaking, this would require increasing the budget of the European Union at the mini-
mum by three hundred percent, from about one to four percent of European Union 
GDP, at a time when member states are facing strong pressures for fiscal austerity.31 
This does not take into account problems of governance, which will be considerable 
between sovereign countries. Unlike East Germany, and very much like Southern Italy, 
it will be out of the question to replace the old local elites with representatives of the 
center.32 Political deals will be inevitable which will more closely resemble Italian than 
German politics.33 Perhaps most importantly, while in Germany and Italy there is still a 
(sometimes surprisingly strong) sense of national identity and obligation, this is clearly 
31 Increasing a country’s contribution to the European Union by three percent of its GDP would 
mean diverting roughly seven-and-a-half percent of its public expenditure to the Brussels re-
gional assistance programs (assuming a government share in the national economy of around 
40 percent). In Germany, where the federal government accounts for about one half of total 
public spending, the federal budget would have to increase by twice as much, about 15 percent. 
32 Remember the Papademos and Monti experiments, which failed dismally. Greece is now gov-
erned by a coalition of the very same parties that contributed to the country’s disaster after 
2008.
33 Even in Germany, voters in the periphery matter, although they are less numerous than in Italy 
and there is much less clientelism there – apart from the fact that voters in the East will obvi-
ously pay attention to national parties’ positions on “financial solidarity.”
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missing, or in any case is much weaker, between, say, the Netherlands and Portugal. It 
seems unlikely that such a sense can be developed on short notice for the purposes of 
stabilizing the EMU. 
Would a supranational European federal state, governed by a democratically elected 
parliament, be better able than the European Union in its present shape to mobilize 
financial solidarity between the rich and poor regions of Euroland? Would political 
union on top of monetary union be the solution to the problem of regional disparities, 
as suggested among others by Jürgen Habermas (2013)? The experience of regionally 
diverse European nation-states speaks against this. Italy with its strong opposition in 
the North to further transfers to the mezzogiorno and the difficulties faced by the Ger-
man federal government as it gets ready to prolong the Aufbau Ost are not the only ex-
amples – see Scottish, Catalan, and Flemish “nationalist” separatism. Indeed everywhere 
in Europe, under the impact of slow economic growth, richer regions increasingly resist 
subsidizing their poorer neighbors as public opinion grows ever more skeptical about 
the capacity of regional policy to make itself expendable. Even in a culturally and in-
stitutionally comparatively homogeneous country like Germany, the long-standing in-
stitution of Länderfinanzausgleich – the constitutional obligation of richer Länder to 
share some of their tax revenue with the poorer ones, to provide for Einheitlichkeit der 
Lebensbedingungen in all parts of the Federal Republic34 – is currently being challenged 
by the richest Land, Bavaria, in the Constitutional Court. Can one expect transfers insti-
tuted by a European parliament between nation-states to be more popular with voters 
than transfers between regions instituted by national parliaments inside nation-states?
What exacerbates the problem in the European case is that, as we have seen, it is only 
three countries – Germany, France and the Netherlands – that are both rich and big 
enough to matter as providers of regional assistance to the Mediterranean and, later, 
Eastern peripheries. In a European parliament, they would have to face the possibility 
of the other countries using their numerical majority to raise the fiscal contributions 
they have to make to the union. This applies in particular to Germany – which will for 
an indefinite future have to attend to its own regional disparities – as France is not just 
economically weaker but has always reserved the choice of defining itself as a Mediter-
ranean country if this fits its interests. This will make it impossible for Germany to agree 
to political union without extensive constitutional safeguards against being made the 
only major payer for the cohesion of the EMU and of Europe as a whole.35
34 In English: uniformity of living conditions. The wording is from Article 106 (3) 2. of the Ger-
man constitution. 
35 Reasons to ask Germany to pay, good or not, are not hard to come by. They reach from the coun-
try’s historical legacy to the fact that the German export industry is the EMU’s most important 
beneficiary. The problem is that Germany, even in combination with France, is far too small to 
shoulder the burden. Moreover, arguments for Germany to pay for Euroland “cohesion,” plau-
sible as they may seem from the outside, will be hard to sell to German voters, especially as fiscal 
austerity will begin to bite in Germany as well. 
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Can distributional conflict inside Euroland be mitigated in the way of the past, by high 
economic growth underwriting redistribution without detracting from the prosperity 
of the rich? While it is true that a rising tide lifts all boats, it seems improbable that such 
a tide will arrive in any foreseeable future. For two decades, growth rates in the center of 
the European state system have fallen. Restoring them to the level of the late 1980s – not 
to mention the 1960s – would require a secular turnaround that nobody can say how it 
could come about (for growth trends in Germany, France and the Netherlands, see Fig-
ure 5). If there is to be growth in the periphery, it will clearly not come from a “Marshall 
Plan” paid for by a prosperous hegemonic center.36 The main support for the periphery 
36 Under the Marshall Plan, formally European Recovery Program (ERP), the U.S. transferred 
around 13 billion US-dollars’ worth of economic aid to Western and Southern European coun-
tries in the four years between 1948 and 1951. This amounted to an average of roughly one 
percent of the yearly GDP of the United States during the period. On orders of magnitude, 
compare this to the estimates in Footnote 30, above. As to control, receiving countries under 
the Marshall plan were by and large free to decide how to use the aid provided to them, even 
though American authorities played a major role in its administration. A strict condition, how-
ever, was that the governments of countries receiving Marshall aid had to help the U.S. contain 
communism and use the funds accordingly. Most of the aid was in the form of American goods; 
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that the center will be able to afford will consist of recipes for neoliberal reform that cost 
nothing to those providing them. However, whether the bitter medicine of neoliberal-
ism will work is uncertain, not to mention whether the patients will be ready to take it.
8 The emerging domestic politics of Euroland
What are the prospects for the European state system if, as is likely, its elites insist on 
defending the euro? Everything points to a long-drawn crisis, lasting for many years 
after the present emergency has been declared to be over. Political life in integrated 
Europe will be highly uncomfortable, both within and between member countries. In-
ternational distributional conflict will be rampant, between a periphery of countries 
deprived of the capacity to devalue their currencies to improve their “competitiveness,” 
and a center suffering from overextension, especially once the Balkan states have been 
admitted to the European Union and the EMU. Financial support as can be made avail-
able to the periphery will not be nearly enough to help them keep up with the center, 
to say nothing of equalizing living conditions across Europe. In the most likely case, it 
will serve to keep in power “pro-European” coalitions that may, however, need to secure 
electoral support by means of anti-Northern rhetoric, making them seem, in Northern 
eyes, to be biting the hands that feed them.
The domestic politics of Euroland will likely be dominated by an ongoing and poten-
tially ugly tug-of-war over entitlements and obligations to international financial soli-
darity. While the center will urge the periphery to implement “structural reforms,” so 
as to become self-sufficient, it will still have to provide financial subsidies of various 
kinds in order to insure against political instability. Discontent with the European con-
struction, unless calmed by renewed economic growth, will require effective suspension 
of democracy in both the center and the periphery – in the latter by institutionalized 
curtailment of national sovereignty, like that under the Fiscal Compact, combined with 
political and economic intimidation of electorates; and in the former by a cartel of si-
lence organized by the political class to hide the true costs of keeping Euroland together 
(costs which in effect amount to subsidies for national export industries). Government, 
renamed “governance,” will migrate to institutions insulated from political and electoral 
accountability, like the European Commission and, in particular, the European Central 
Bank (Mair 2013). Their advantage is that they are better placed than national gov-
ernments to rule by stealth – for example, by surreptitiously extending credit to states 
that have lost access to capital markets, keeping the economy going by injecting into it 
potentially unlimited amounts of synthetic money, underwriting or mutualizing the 
the remainder came as loans. Receiving countries had to submit four-year plans specifying what 
aid they needed and how they would use it. Revenue from the sale of American goods was used 
by receiving countries in accordance with bilateral agreements (Judt 2005).
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bad debt of underregulated national banking systems, and insuring financial investors 
against governments defaulting on their loans. One may doubt whether this will make 
for economic stability or, for that matter, the “ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe” proclaimed by the Treaties. 
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